OBERGEFELL’S PRESCRIPTION: WHY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TRUMPS STATE
EMPLOYEES’ FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
By: Douglas B. McKechnie*
Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision finding a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 1 some
politicians and public employees have asserted an ostensible First
Amendment right to refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. For example, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton declared in
an official opinion letter that Texas state employees retain the right to
rely on their “religious freedoms” and “religious objections” and refuse
to issue same-sex marriage licenses. 2 However, neither the Attorney
General’s opinion, nor any current or future concocted state law, nor the
First Amendment will allow such religiously based refusals to comply
with the Obergefell decision—the court’s own Free Exercise
jurisprudence has seen to that.
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court announced that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the government to
meet a strict scrutiny standard if a law substantially burdened citizens’
rights to the free exercise of religion. 3 In that case, a religious adherent
was fired from her job after refusing to work on the day of her Sabbath.
She filed for, and was denied, unemployment compensation because the
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state found her religious justification for refusing to work unacceptable. 4
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and found that denying Ms.
Sherbert unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. 5 The court reasoned that the state’s eligibility
restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant
burden on Sherbert’s ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore,
there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial
burden on this basic First Amendment right.
Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court decided Employment
Division v. Smith, 6 which sharply limited the potential application of
strict scrutiny in favor of a rational basis test. In that case, two Native
Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were fired from their jobs for
ingesting peyote—a powerful hallucinogen—as part of a sacrament of
their church. 7 The two filed for unemployment compensation but were
denied because the state in which they resided, Oregon, prohibited the
possession and use of peyote. 8 The state refused to award them benefits
because of their use of this illegal drug despite their religious purpose. 9
Smith and Black claimed that the refusal to award unemployment
compensation was a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
They argued that Oregon’s denial of unemployment
Clause. 10
compensation did not meet the strict scrutiny standard as required by
Thus, under strict scrutiny, Oregon’s law
court precedent. 11
substantially burdened their free exercise of religion, Oregon lacked a
compelling governmental interest, and the law was not narrowly tailored
to accomplish this governmental interest.12 The court disagreed with
their argument and held that if a law is one of general application, not
intentionally targeted at religion, 13 then the constitutionality of the law is
tested under the rational basis test. To the likely chagrin of some state
employees who object to Obergefell, the religious adherents in
Employment Division were faced with a court that wanted to return to a

4. Id. at 399-401.
5. Id. at 403, 408-09.
6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. Id. at 874.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 882-83.
12. See generally, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07.
13. See generally, Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 881 (The court noted that at times strict
scrutiny will be appropriate when an individual claims that a law regulates religiously motivated
action in conjunction with another constitutionally protected liberty such as speech or press).
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rational basis standard, or a pre-Sherbert interpretation 14 of the Free
Exercise Clause.
The court in Employment Division determined that the Free
Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and [religious-]neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).” 15 The court reasoned that because
Oregon’s law proscribed the use of peyote without being animated by its
religious significance, Smith and Black’s religious motivation for failing
to comply with the law was immaterial.16 Indeed, the Court held “a
stance of conscientious opposition [never] relieves an objector from any
colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.” 17 If the individual is
free to disregard laws that fail to coincide with his own religious beliefs,
then the individual will “become a law unto himself.” 18 These are the
principles that animate (or undergird) the Free Exercise Clause rights
invoked by some who intend to ignore Obergefell and the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Obergefell, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
compels states to issue same-sex couples marriage licenses where they
also issue opposite-sex couples marriage licenses. 19 In other words, the
citizens of the United States, through the democratically enacted
Fourteenth Amendment, require the states to offer marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. 20 Indeed, the Constitution, either in the text or as
interpreted by the court, is full of proscriptions and prescriptions. For
example, the Constitution proscribes an individual from being President
of the United States if he or she is under the age of 35. 21 Moreover, the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment would prescribe the
issuance of a permit to someone wishing to hold a demonstration if he
otherwise met the threshold articulated by a parade permitting law.22
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes the right to same-sex
marriage. Yet states, like corporations, can only act through human
14. See e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890).
15. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. at 884.
17. Id. at 882 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 461(1971); internal quotation
marks omitted).
18. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879); internal
quotation marks omitted).
19. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250, *42 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (U.S. 1969).
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beings in the form of elected officials and employees. The question then
arises: who is compelled, in a practical sense, to effectuate the
prescriptions found in the Constitution and empower the fundamental
right to same-sex marriage found in the Fourteenth Amendment?
Certainly same-sex couples cannot issue marriage licenses to
themselves. Issuing marriage licenses is a function of the state and an
act that must be performed by the state. Therefore, the Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental right to same sex-marriage is only realized
with a concomitant prescription to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. That prescription falls upon the state and, ultimately, the
employee whose duties include issuing marriage licenses. Therefore, a
state employee who refuses to issue a marriage license to a same-sex
couple because they are the same sex is acting on behalf of the state.
Upon a state employee’s refusal to issue such a marriage license, the
state, in that moment, violates the couple’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 23
Concededly, these state employees have free exercise rights under
the First Amendment. Indeed, state laws 24 and administrative opinions 25
seem to attempt to reassert or bolster state employees’ free exercise
rights while at the same time positioning those rights as an affirmative
defense to a same-sex couple’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. Thus a
conflict emerges: a state employee that is constitutionally duty bound to
issue same-sex marriage licenses may have a free exercise interest and
state law “right” to opt-out of issuing same-sex marriage licenses. This
Fourteenth Amendment prescription tips the justice scale in favor of one
position, while the First Amendment and state law balance out the other
side of the scale.
It goes without saying that the Fourteenth Amendment, and any
prescriptions found therein, is superior to state law or administrative
opinions. If the Fourteenth Amendment prescribes an act by the state,
and by extension a state employee, the state is utterly powerless to
authorize the employee to opt-out of the prescription. Accordingly, the
Fourteenth Amendment certainly trumps state law. However, as
discussed above, state law is not the only law on which the employee
might rely. The employee may believe, from a religious perspective,
23. Whether a state employee can, in keeping with the Constitution, refuse to issue a
marriage license for reasons not specifically addressed by the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this piece.
24. NC S.B. 2 (2015).
25. Rights Of Government Officials Involved With Issuing Same-Sex Marriage Licenses
And Conducting Same-Sex Wedding Ceremonies, TX Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0025 (2015).
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that same-sex marriage is an abomination. To be sure, the Free Exercise
Clause protects “first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.” 26 The employee may then feel
compelled by his or her truly held religious beliefs to deny the same-sex
couple a license. It is then a conflict between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment that must be resolved.
As discussed in Employment Division, government inevitably
places prescriptions on its citizens through the democratic process. 27
Most often those prescriptions come in the form of state or federal
legislation requiring an act by a citizen. Those prescriptions are, of
course, subordinate to the Constitution and must comply with its
protections—including the Free Exercise Clause. 28 In the conflict
described above, however, the prescription derives not from middling
legislation but rather the democratically enacted Fourteenth Amendment
itself. Therefore, if an employee relies on the First Amendment to refuse
to issue same-sex marriage licenses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
prescription must be held up against the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause. One amendment need not be subservient to
the other; instead they must be read in conjunction in light of the
jurisprudence that has brought them to life. In such a situation, the Free
Exercise Clause provides no safe-harbor.
Ultimately, the Constitution, while peerless and revered, is merely a
set of democratically enacted laws. The Fourteenth Amendment, which
encompasses the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection rights
therein, and any prescriptions that flow from these rights, are part of
those laws. There is no credible argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment is anything but a valid, religion-neutral, generally
applicable law. The text of the amendment does not refer to religion or
seek to prescribe or proscribe actions simply because of their religious
nature. 29 Moreover, the Substantive Due Process rights found in the
amendment are equally religion-neutral and generally applicable. 30
They are simply secular rights that exist irrespective of religion.
To be sure, it is possible that all of the rights and concomitant
26. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877.
27. Id. at 882.
28. See generally, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. “In addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, . . . to have children, . . .
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, . . . to marital privacy, . . . to use
contraception, . . . to bodily integrity, . . . and to abortion . . . .” Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720 (1997) (citations omitted).

26

CONLAWNOW

[7:21

prescriptions (or proscriptions) found in the Fourteenth Amendment
impose upon one religious belief or another, but that alone does not
undermine them pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. The legal dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment would only give way to the Free Exercise
Clause if they were motivated by religious animosity. 31 A public
employee’s constitutional obligation to issue a same-sex marriage
license certainly may impose upon the employee’s truly held religious
belief. However, “[t]he mere possession of religious convictions which
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.” 32
The court in Obergefell was clear that its decision does not compel
religious institutions to recognize or even condone same-sex marriage. 33
Of course that is true because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to
the states and federal government. However, that application to the
states compels them to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 34
Every refusal to do so is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
violation occurs whether the state acts as a sovereign entity through
legislative or executive action or through a single employee’s refusal to
issue such a license. Neither state law nor the Free Exercise Clause can
function as an opt-out or defense for the failure to comply with the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the court in Employment
Division held, the First Amendment “does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply” with the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 If it did,
the Free Exercise Clause would permit state employees to flout the
democratic will of the people as expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment
and “become a law unto [themselves].” 36

31. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 532.
32. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, 2015 U.S. LEXIS at 48-49.
34. Id. at 42.
35. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879.
36. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879); internal
quotation marks omitted).

